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The paper presents the results of the research on the impact of the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union on Member States’ ability to build small, minimal 
blocking coalitions in the Council. To this end, the theory of voting games was used, but 
departing from the assumption that the creation of each possible coalition of players is equally 
likely. It was also assumed that they do not necessarily make decisions independently of each 
other, and the analysis focuses on the ability to build minimal blocking coalitions. 
The conducted analysis indicates that after Brexit the ability of the Council members 
to form small minimally blocking coalitions will have changed significantly. The UK's 
withdrawal from the EU will strengthen the position of the other five member states with the 
largest population in the Council, in particular Germany and France. The position of the five 
most-populated member states will determine the scope of a possible compromise in the 
Council to an even greater extent. 
The presented research was financed by the National Science Centre, as part of project 
No. UMO-2016/23/D/HS5/00408 (SONATA 12) entitled The Impact of Brexit and 
Unconditional Introduction of the "Double Majority" Voting System on the Decision-Making 
Process in the  Council of the European Union. 
 







In the light of previous research, there is no doubt that decisions in the Council are 
worked out primarily through consensual negotiations
1
 and Member States do not generally 
begin talks with a cold calculation of the possibility of building a blocking coalition
2
. Carried 
out rather implicitly than explicitly, voting boils down to the formal adoption of earlier 
arrangements. The culture of consensus is an important part of the political culture in the 
Council
3
 and, after the entry into force of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, changes 
taking part within it can be observed. Raising an objection by those members of the Council  
that are unable to build a blocking coalition is considered exaggerated action. An informal 
rule operates, according to which all member states should defend the adopted common 
position in Council negotiations with the European Parliament.
4
  
The decisions taken in the Council are relatively rarely contested by member states, 
whether by abstaining from voting, or by raising objections.
5
 However, legislative projects in 
which the positions of member states are strongly polarized are also proceeded upon. 
Although such cases are not frequent, they concern issues defined as being of significance for 
a "vital national interest", or important for party rivalry in the domestic arena. At the same 
time, they arouse strong media interest and focus the electorate's attention.  
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This may explain why, in the course of carrying out institutional reforms in the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU), member states evaluated the system of 
weighing votes in the Council from the perspective of winning possible allies and building 
coalitions on specific issues, which could be the subject of decision-making.
6
 Sozański points 
out that while negotiating the provisions of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
member states were not so much interested in the value of mathematical indices of voting 
power as in the ability to build blocking coalitions, consisting of a relatively small number of 
members.
7
 In view of the activity of facilitators in the decision-making process in the EU, 
such as the European Commission, the rotating presidency, and the President of the European 
Council, it is very difficult to build a blocking coalition consisting of a large number of states. 
The research presented by Thomson indicates that even in the case of legislative proposals 
that are very controversial in the Council, one can rarely count on the establishment of a 
blocking coalition of 10-12 countries.
8
 
Decisions in the EU are arrived at primarily through inter-institutional negotiations  
conducted in trilogues.
9
 However, the Council begins negotiations in a trilogue, if there is a 
majority in the institution sufficient to adopt a common position.
10
 This suggests that the 
creation of a blocking coalition in the Council may affect not only the position of this 
institution in the legislative process, but also the outcome of the decision-making process. 
 Based on the analysis of all legislative projects on environmental policy proceeded 
upon in the Council between the first round of the Eastern enlargement and the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Warntjen  shows the existence of a positive correlation between 
the probability of success of a member state’s requests and the number of votes backing                 
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 Requests for derogations, extensions, or lower standards more than twice as 
often ended in at least partial success, if they were filed by those member states that were able 
to form a blocking coalition in the Council. At the same time, obtaining partial concessions 
was definitely more likely than achieving full success.
12
 The results of Warntjen's research 
indicate that, for member states, a blocking coalition is a tool for forcing further discussion in 
the Council and strengthening their own position in negotiations conducted in order to reach a 
compromise. 
One of the most important arguments for introducing the system of the so-called 
double majority of weighing votes in the Council and, thus, the abandonment of the Nice 
system, was the relative ease of adapting the new way of weighing votes in the event of 
accession of other states to the EU. However, when designing the double majority system, it 
was not anticipated that one of the largest member states could leave the EU. With a 
population of over 65.8 million people (12.85% of the total EU population), the United 
Kingdom ranks, in this respect, third among the 28 EU countries. Consequently, Brexit may 
be presumed to change the ability of member states to form winning and blocking coalitions 
in the Council. Thus, a question arises as to how the UK's withdrawal from the EU will affect 
member state’s ability to build a blocking coalitions in this institution. 
 
Notation, definitions and methods 
 Solving the posed research problem requires finding answers to at least two research 
questions: 
1. How will member state’s ability to build minimal blocking coalitions in the Council  
change as a result of Brexit ? 
2. How will the ability of Council members to develop minimal winning coalitions change as a 
result of Brexit in the case when a European Commission's initiative will not be supported by 
two of the five Member States with the largest populations  
In order to obtain answers to the posed research questions, the theory of cooperative 
games was applied and, in particular, proper simple games, also called voting games, were 
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. Simple games are sometimes defined as
14
 "a conflict in which the only objective is 
winning and the only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions of players are winning"
15
. 
It should be emphasized that the theory of cooperative games does not deal with such 
problems as the way in which players make their own choices within a coalition, or the way a 
coalition is formed, and thus the players’ reaching an agreement to undertake joint action. 
Voting games, are often used to model voting in decision-making bodies and to measure 
players' voting power. 
 For a simple game in which n (voting) players take part, N ={i1,i2,…,in} is a non-
empty, finite set of S players, which is a subset of the set N. Each subset S ⊆ N is referred to 
as a coalition - including also the  empty set ∅ which is a coalition that does not contain any 
player. Like in Felsenthal and Machover, the term coalition is understood as any possible                 
set of players.
16
 The number of players in a finite set, e.g. S is marked as    . Simple games                  
in which          are called n-person simple games. In simple games, for each set S the 
characteristic function takes only one of two values             . W stands for the set of all 
winning coalitions.  The set S is the winning coalition S ∈  W  when and only when       .  
If       , then and only then S is not the winning coalition S ∉ W. A winning coalition is a 
set of players which, as part of the game, is sufficient to adopt, impose a decision on all 
players. 
The simple game G is such a pair (N,W) that17:  
 ∅ ∉ W, an empty set, in which there are no players, cannot be a winning coalition;  
 N ∈ W, a set of all players is a winning coalition; 
 If S ∈ W and S ⊆ T, then T ∈ W  - if the set S is a winning coalition and the set T 
contains all players from the sets S, then the set T is also a winning coalition. 
Player i is a swing member of the coalition S , if S ∈ W and S \{i}=0, and thus when after 
leaving the coalition S by player i, it ceases to be a winning coalition, and player i has the            
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so-called negative swing, or the ability to transform the winning coalition S ∈ W into the            
non-winning coalition S \{i}∉ W. 
The set MW consists of all the subsets N being minimal winning coalitions. Von 
Neuman and Morgenstern proposed the concept of a minimal winning coalition, defining it as 
"a set of these elements of S ∈ W of which no proper subset18 belongs to W "19. Deegan and 
Packel defined a minimal winning coalition in the following way:  
MW  = { S ∈ W ∣∀ of the non-empty T ⊆ S ˄ S \ T ∉ W }20 . 
The above definitions show that for every coalition S ∈ W, the set S is called a minimal 
winning coalition, if and only if S \ i ∉ W  for each i ∈ S. Hence, in a minimal winning 
coalition, each player is a swing member of the coalition. 
The S set for which        can be a losing or blocking coalition. B is a set of 
blocking coalitions for N. S ∈ B, if S ∉ W and N \ S ∉ W. The set S is the minimal blocking 
coalition S ∈ MB ,  if no proper subset of S belongs to B, hence: 
MB = {S ∈ B  ∀ of the non-empty T ⊆ S ˄ S \ T ∉ B}. 
L is a family of subsets of the set N called losing coalitions. The set S is a losing coalition, 
if N \ S ∈ W. Each proper subset of the set S ∈ L is a losing coalition. 
Weighted voting games are a subclass of voting games. We define the decision-
making threshold q as the minimum, required number of votes that a coalition of players has 
to gather in order for the initiative proceeded upon to be accepted. By wi we mean the weight 
of player i’s vote. The game (N, wi∈N, q) is called a weighted voting game, if Σi∈N wi ≥ q and 
∀ i ∈ Nwi > 0, and the characteristic function      takes the values: 
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The presented research uses an original variant of voting games, which is 
distinguished by two characteristic features. First of all, the analysis is focused on the players' 
ability to build minimal blocking coalitions, and thus on the structure of blocking for voting 
games. It makes it possible to determine how a change in the vote weighing system in the 
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Council affects the relative ability of individual states to create such coalitions, taking into 
account the decision-making threshold and the distribution of voting weights. From the 
perspective of individual players, it makes it possible to identify key partners needed to set up 
blocking coalitions. As a consequence, it may be an introduction to a qualitative analysis 
consisting in the assessment of the feasibility of establishing certain coalitions in the Council, 
by comparing the position taken by a given government in matters relevant to it with the 
preferences of the key partners needed to set up a blocking or winning coalition. Secondly, 
there is a departure from the assumption that the formation of each coalition of players is 
equally likely and that they independently decide on how to vote. As a consequence, to some 
extent, it makes it possible to take into account in the analysis the role that the agenda setters 
(and, in the subject of the analysis, the European Commission in particular) play in the 
decision-making process. It also makes it possible to perform the analysis assuming that 
within the voting body there are groups of players with different preferences as regards a 
given issue. In the presented studies, an assumption was made that at least 55% of the 
Council's members, including the majority of EU countries with a population of over 30 
million, would be ready to support the European Commission's proposal.  
Even in the case of draft legislation that raises great controversy in the EU, the chances of 
creating a blocking coalition consisting of 13 countries in the Council are very small. This is 
indicated by Thomson's research on legislative initiatives, in which strong divisions inside the 
Council were revealed
21
, as well as the experience from proceeding upon the Directive 
2018/957 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, 
and the legislative package on EU-ETS reform.
22
   
Cases in which member states are unable to adopt a common position in the Council are 
extremely rare. Of the 72 draft legal acts proceeded upon under the co-decision/ordinary 
legislative procedure, which were withdrawn by the European Commission between July 1, 
2009 and December 31, 2018,
23
 only in the case of 10 it was not possible to reach political 
agreement or adopt a common position in the Council, including in one case the Council 
considered the initiative as a violation of its exclusive competence.  
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In order to calculate the number of minimal blocking and minimal winning coalitions 
possible to be created, a research tool in the form of the POWERGEN 5.0 program was used 
for the selected voting games. It contains a feature that makes it possible to prepare detailed 
coalition statistics for individual players. It also makes it possible to specify for a blocking 
minority the minimum number of players necessary to create it. None of the commonly 
available programs has such a function, and it is important in the analysis of the vote 
weighing system in the Council in the case of adopting decisions by a qualified majority. 
After Brexit, in the so-called double majority system,  a blocking coalition will consist of at 
least four members of the Council.
24
 In addition, the POWERGEN 5.0 program makes it 
possible to limit the analysis to only part of all possible combinations of players (coalitions), 
and thus to depart from the assumption that the creation of any coalition is equally likely. 
It should be borne in mind that for the purpose of qualified majority voting in the 
Council, the EU population number is construed de facto as the number of residents.
25
  Each 
year, it is provided by Eurostat for all member states.
26
 The presented studies used the number 
of residents of individual EU states as at January 1, 2017.
27
  
The study uses the term "large member states", which means the six member states with 
the largest population for the European Union consisting of 28 countries, and Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and Poland after potential leaving the EU by the United Kingdom. 
 
 
The impact of Brexit on the ability to build blocking coalitions by the five Member 
States with the largest population 
After the UK's withdrawal from the EU, it will still be difficult to build a blocking 
coalition in which only one EU country with a population of more than 35 million 
participates. Table 1 presents the minimum number of countries needed in such a situation to 
form a blocking coalition in the Council in the case of selected member states and the 
Visegrad Group, both before and after Brexit.  
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Table 1. The minimum size of a blocking coalition in the Council, in which only one large 
member state participates - before and after the UK's withdrawal from the EU. 
Member States 





Germany 1+8 1+6 
France 1+10 1+7 
United Kingdom 1+10 - 
Italy 1+11 1+8 
Spain 1+12 1+10 
Poland 1+12 1+11 
Visegrad Group 4+9 4+8 
Source: Own calculations. 
After the UK's withdrawal from the EU, the creation of a blocking coalition in the 
Council around one large state will become hypothetically a bit easier.  In practice, however, 
France, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Visegrad Group (V4) have only a theoretical possibility 
to build a blocking coalition, without the participation of another large state.   
Table 2 indicates that after Brexit it will become more difficult to adopt a decision in 
the Council against the position of two of the five Member States with the largest population 
in the EU.
28
 Comparing the left and right sides of Table 2, it should be noted that it will 
generally be more difficult to build a winning coalition facing the objection of two large 
member states, in particular Germany, France or Italy. Adopting a decision in the Council 
against the position of the German-French tandem will require the creation of a winning 
coalition consisting of at least 20 states. At the same time, only 44 such coalitions are possible 
to be set up. In the case of raising objections by Germany and Italy, the real decision-making 
threshold in the Council will have increased to at least 18 countries, with 193 minimal 
blocking coalitions possible to be built. This means that if these countries coordinate their 
positions presented in the Council, the European Commission will have to take due account of 
their interests at the stage of preparing the initiative. As a consequence, the position of the 
five largest member states will determine the scope of a possible compromise in the Council 
even more than before, with a particularly large influence of Germany and France. 
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 It is very unlikely that three large member states would be forced to build a blocking coalition in the Council.  
In such a case, its creation would be almost certain. One cannot ignore the significant political power of such a 
group of states in the Council, which cannot be reduced only to the weight of their vote, either. Since the entry 
into force of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, regarding the change of the Nice system of weighing votes 
in the Council to the so-called double majority system, there has been no case of a legislative initiative in which 
three large Member States would be forced to form a blocking coalition. Being aware of the difficulties this 
would mean for a planned initiative, the European Commission would rather take into account the interests of 
the largest member states in its proposal, or would give up putting forward the initiative, at least at a given time. 
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Table 2. The actual threshold of the number of states for QMV adopted decisions in the Council,  
on the initiative of the European Commission, in the case of opposition of selected states.  
States opposing 
the initiative 
EU 28 EU 27 after Brexit 
Minimum 
number of 




























Germany, France 16 75 4023 20 7 44 
Germany, Italy 16 1012 8345 18 5 193 
Germany, Spain 16 43849 60231 15 15 2805 
Germany, Poland 16 141771 157997 15 1086 8549 
France, Italy 16 49417 66231 15 22 3117 
France, Spain 16 264579 280084 15 8842 21116 
France, Poland 16 433716 443467 15 51154 67610 
Italy, Poland 16 383759 397416 15 31728 47248 
Italy, Spain 16 530437 539429 15 115196 131823 
Spain, Poland 16 640345 651819 15 384921 393463 
Germany, V4 16 6974 7656 15 1 68 
France, V4 16 29362 29767 15 1620 2186 
Italy, V4 16 37912 38177 15 5238 5919 
Spain, V4 16 48981 49054 15 25229 25741 
Source: Own calculations. 
   
After the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, it will be very difficult to create a winning 
coalition facing the opposition of Germany and France or Germany and Italy. This means that 
while preparing a legislative initiative, the European Commission will have to take into 
account even more the preferences of the three EU Member States with the largest population, 
and above all Germany. As a consequence, Brexit will lead in this respect to a more 
pronounced imbalance between the five Member States with the largest population.  
In the case of absence of support for a legislative initiative of the European 
Commission on the part of Germany, France and Italy, the creation of a winning coalition will 
become practically impossible, since all other members of the Council, i.e. 24 states, would 
have to participate in it. 
 After the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, it will be much more difficult 
to build a winning coalition in the Council in the face of contesting the initiative by the 
Visegrad Group together with one large member state, in particular by presenting a common 
position with the German government. In the latter case, although it is possible to create a 
minimal winning coalition of 15 countries, only one such coalition actually exists. In the case 
of building a blocking coalition by Poland and Germany together, it is necessary to recruit 
11 
 
additional 4-5 member states to create it. Therefore, in this situation, the presentation of the 
common position by the Visegrad Group raises the attractiveness of the states forming it as 
potential coalition partners. In economic and financial matters, the position of the Visegrad 
Group may be closer to the position taken by the German government, than to the position of 
Spain. Should the position of Germany and the Visegrad Group states be supported by at least 
one member state of the group, i.e. Romania, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, 
then a blocking coalition is formed in the Council. For Germany, after Brexit, cooperation 
with the Visegrad Group to strengthen its negotiating position in the Council by creating a 
blocking coalition may be a viable alternative to its cooperation with Italy.  
 After the UK's withdrawal from the EU, in a situation in which the five biggest EU 
member states will be seeking to build a blocking coalition and three states will be supporting 
the presented initiative, the Netherlands and Romania, the position of which will have a 
significant impact on the chances of creating a blocking coalition, will proverbially tip the 
balance. 
 In the case of coordinating the position in the Council by Germany and France, it is 
unlikely that these states should have to form a blocking coalition, as both their voting weight 
in the institution in question (cf. Table 2) and their political power are very big. In such a 
situation, the governments in Paris and Berlin are usually the backbone of a winning coalition 
in the Council.  
Table 3 presents the blocking structure for the voting game in the Council with the 
following assumptions: 
 qualified majority voting is applied (“double majority voting”); 
 the legislative initiative enjoys the support of at least 55% of EU states; 
 the initiative is not to be supported by at most two member states with a population of 
over 35 million. 
Despite the fact that, as a result of Brexit, the number of all possible coalitions in the 
Council will be halved, the number of minimal blocking coalitions likely to be set up by 4-6 
EU states will have increased. This indicates that after the UK's withdrawal from the EU, it 
will become easier for large member states to build a blocking coalition consisting of 4-6 
members, because it will be easier for especially the three states with the largest population to 
find coalition members with a sufficiently large number of residents. It will be difficult to 




The number of blocking coalitions in the Council possible to be created by 7 or 8 
countries will have decreased, which means that for member states with a population of less 
than 35 million people, it will be more difficult to create small blocking coalitions. Germany 
will gain a huge advantage in building smallest minimal blocking coalitions.   
Table 3. Small, minimal blocking coalitions possible to be set up in the Council, assuming that at 





EU 27 after Brexit 
The number of coalition members The number of coalition members 
4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8 
Germany 7 382 1703 4838 9864   320 275 1260 2519 4504 




763 3039 7963   
_ _ _ _ _ 
Italy 1 59 616 2894 8008   127 218 876 2323 6272 
Spain 0 0 82 940 4204   13 125 1147 3260 7438 
Poland 0 0 1 287 1814   1 54 586 2499 7314 
Romania 7 187 596 2697 7196   59 90 690 2052 5813 
Netherlands 3 166 549 2370 7332   52 135 580 1985 5567 
Belgium 1 92 515 2275 6571   43 66 679 1905 5386 
Greece 1 82 505 2338 6464   42 60 617 1984 5629 
Czech Republic 1 76 510 2323 6447   39 82 604 1911 5543 
Portugal 1 74 515 2289 6424   39 76 616 1954 5566 
Sweden 0 87 514 2225 6431   39 72 599 1987 5495 
Hungary 0 85 489 2219 6390   38 80 575 2001 5601 
Austria 0 65 509 2327 6321   37 69 469 2099 5477 
Bulgaria 0 42 498 1934 6516   32 83 499 1897 5238 
Denmark 0 34 408 1842 6297   28 52 572 1785 5291 
Finland 0 33 389 1846 6154   28 45 569 1764 5351 
Slovakia 0 31 400 1844 6147   26 55 563 1755 5356 
Ireland 0 29 336 1814 5929   25 45 500 1730 5176 
Croatia 0 24 308 1696 5624   24 38 438 1646 5169 
Lithuania 0 17 191 1431 5135   23 29 317 1356 4392 
Slovenia 0 11 149 1157 4471   18 42 260 1182 3952 
Latvia 0 11 141 1091 4318   17 42 249 1161 3862 
Estonia 0 8 99 809 3428   15 30 178 924 3171 
Cyprus 0 4 73 554 2620   12 29 123 676 2459 
Luxembourg 0 3 54 393 1998   12 20 87 532 1894 
Malta 0 3 40 286 1589   12 14 72 414 1478 
Total 7 388 1947 7552 19967   330 418 2464 6921 16930 
Source: Own calculations. 
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After Brexit, the five EU states with the largest population will gain a greater capacity to build 
small, minimal blocking coalitions, although Poland will benefit from this change relatively 
less compared to the other members of this group.  
 Table 4 shows what will be the ability of member states to create small minimal 
blocking coalitions in the Council after Brexit, depending on the position of Germany with 
regard to the potential initiative, with the same assumptions that were adopted for the 
calculations in Table 3.  
Table 4. Small, minimal blocking coalitions possible to be set up in the Council, assuming that at 
least 55% of member states and three large EU states support the initiative of the European 
Commission. 
Member State 
Minimal blocking coalitions involving Germany 
for EU-27 
 
Minimal blocking coalitions not involving Germany 
for EU-27 
The number of coalition members The number of coalition members 
4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8 
Germany 320 275 1260 2519 4504   
_ _ _ _ _ 
France 189 21 7 3 0   10 143 1052 3143 7046 
Italy 117 83 89 47 23   10 135 787 2276 6249 
Spain 13 117 656 939 936   0 8 491 2321 6502 
Poland 1 54 508 1435 2262   0 0 78 1064 5052 
Romania 51 61 220 275 1368   8 29 470 1777 4445 
Netherlands 49 55 203 418 1384   3 80 377 1567 4183 
Belgium 41 45 304 582 1255   2 21 375 1323 4131 




275 626 1318   
1 35 329 1285 4225 
Portugal 38 42 307 606 1384   1 34 309 1348 4182 
Sweden 38 40 295 628 1363   1 32 304 1359 4132 
Hungary 37 49 293 647 1378   1 31 282 1354 4223 
Austria 36 41 248 794 1409   1 28 221 1305 4068 
Bulgaria 32 56 258 670 1343   0 27 241 1227 3895 
Denmark 28 38 314 728 1402   0 14 258 1057 3889 
Finland 28 31 328 742 1412   0 14 241 1022 3939 
Slovakia 26 42 322 738 1414   0 13 241 1017 3942 
Ireland 25 34 291 749 1412   0 11 209 981 3764 
Croatia 24 27 268 756 1466   0 11 170 890 3703 
Lithuania 23 21 188 634 1445   0 8 129 722 2947 
Slovenia 18 36 163 570 1366   0 6 97 612 2586 
Latvia 17 37 159 558 1335   0 5 90 603 2527 
Estonia 15 25 124 471 1162   0 5 54 453 2009 
Cyprus 12 26 86 354 961   0 3 37 322 1498 
Luxembourg 12 18 63 284 756   0 2 24 248 1138 
Malta 12 13 53 222 603   0 1 19 192 875 
Total 320 275 1260 2519 4504   10 143 1204 4402 12426 




The analysis of the data contained in it makes it possible to conclude that after the UK's 
withdrawal from the EU, Poland will not be a member of any the four- or five-member 
blocking coalitions built without the participation of Germany.  Out of the 330 four-member 
minimal blocking coalitions, in 320 cases Germany is an indispensable member of such a 
coalition. At the same time, the government in Berlin will have much greater freedom in 
choosing coalition partners for four-member minimal blocking coalitions. All EU states with a 
population of less than 10 million will also become a potential coalition partner.                 
 After Brexit, France will have a large capacity to build small, minimal blocking 
coalitions, even in the case of supporting a legislative initiative by the German government, 
provided that the position of the government in Paris is supported by another large EU state, 
especially Italy or Spain.  At the same time, in the case of support for the legislative initiative 
by Germany, Poland's ability to form blocking coalitions consisting of six or seven states 
largely depends on the support of France. It is an indispensable member of 83.3% and 74.1% 
of such coalitions possible to be set up by Poland, respectively. 
 The UK's withdrawal from the EU will also have an impact on the balance of power 
on the euro vs. non-euro axis. In the European Union consisting of 28 Member States, nine 
countries not belonging to the Eurozone (the United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, the Czech 
Republic, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark, Bulgaria, and Croatia) constitute approximately 
33.34% of all EU residents. Therefore, they cannot set up a blocking coalition in the Council. 
However, not much is necessary to cross the threshold of 35% of the EU population. Only one 
additional state with a population equal to, or bigger than Austria or, for example, Ireland and 
Slovakia. As a consequence, non-Eurozone member states could count on taking advantage of 
any discrepancies within the Eurogroup to protect their own interests. In addition, the political 
power of the United Kingdom in the Council was greater than it resulted from its formal 
voting weight in that institution.  
 After the UK's withdrawal from the EU, all large EU states, except Poland, will belong 
to the European Monetary Union. The euro is currently the currency of 19 member states, and 
in the future one should expect an increase in this number. From this perspective, Brexit 
reduces Poland’s chances to build a blocking coalition in the event of support for an initiative 
by Germany, France, Italy and Spain almost to zero.  After Brexit, states not belonging to the 
Eurozone will constitute only slightly more than 23% of the EU population, and Poland will 
be the only big state in this group. Even if Poland's position is supported by Italy, the creation 
of a blocking coalition will be difficult due to the small number of potential coalition partners.  
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In turn, the planned adoption of the euro currency by other member states
29
 will make it 
difficult to take advantage of the contradictions in interests between the Eurozone states.   
 
Conclusions 
The presented results indicate that Brexit will have a significant impact on member 
state's ability to build minimal blocking coalitions in the Council, as well as on the position of 
individual actors in the decision-making process in the EU.  
The UK's withdrawal from the EU will strengthen the position of the five member 
states with the largest population in the Council, in particular Germany and France. It can be 
said that as a result of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, the importance of the population 
criterion in the building of blocking and winning coalitions within the Council will increase. 
The position of the five most-populated member states will determine the scope of a possible 
compromise in the Council to an even greater extent.  In this group, Poland will benefit the 
least from the change that will take place in the vote weighing system as a result of Brexit. It 
will be decidedly more difficult to adopt a QMV decision in the Council against the position 
of Germany and France or Germany and Italy, and Brexit will lead to the breaking of the 
relative equality that has existed between the EU states with the largest population. 
The modification of the vote weighing system in the Council, which will take place as 
a result of Brexit, may pose a threat to the Community method, as it will limit the ability of 
the European Commission to balance the interests of large and smaller member states in the 
law-making process, as well as reduce its freedom to propose solutions in the legislative 
initiatives prepared by it.  On the other hand, it may also tempt the European Commission to 
support the interests of selected, major EU states, in order to speed up the decision-making 
process, which will significantly hamper the construction of a blocking coalition in the 
3Council. 
 The adoption of a decision in the Council against the position of the German-French 
tandem, although theoretically possible, will be very unlikely in practice.  If the governments 
in Berlin and Paris coordinate their positions, they will become an indispensable member of 
99.99% of the theoretically possible winning coalitions in the Council. 
After Brexit, the Eurozone countries will have, in the context of decision-making by 
qualified majority, a clear majority in the Council (19 states constituting over 77% of the EU 
population), which creates the risk that de facto decisions on economic and financial matters 
                                                          
29
 Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia have made efforts to join the Eurozone. 
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will be made in the Eurogroup, and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 
will only be used for official approval. The adoption of the single euro currency by other 
member states will make it difficult to build blocking coalitions in the Council by taking 
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